The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has released the main findings of its investigation into the events of October 7, 2023, and the preceding days leading up to the Hamas attack. The initial investigation began in November 2023, and in March 2024, the outgoing IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, instructed all units to launch their own inquiries. The IDF’s report does not include recommendations, as these will be provided by the incoming IDF Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, who will assume the position next week.
The IDF estimates that between 5,000 and 5,600 militants entered Israel in three waves, while 4,696 rockets and mortars were launched into Israel. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals, and 415 security personnel. Additionally, individuals were taken as hostages into the Gaza Strip.
“The primary failing stemmed from an inability to accurately assess Hamas’s intentions and readiness for a large-scale surprise attack,” the report states, according to IDF senior officials.
The IDF reports that Hamas’s attacks were meticulously planned, with preparations beginning nearly seven years before the assault. The “fundamental concept” was formed in November 2016, and an “initial plan” was drafted in July 2017. The plan received approval in July 2019, and the operational plan was finalized in August 2021. A readiness committee was established in early 2022, and throughout the year, the terror group assessed various options for implementing its plan.
The IDF indicates that Hamas considered multiple dates for the attacks, including September 16, Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year), and September 25, Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement). Ultimately, they chose October 7, 2023, coinciding with Simchat Torah, a Jewish holiday marking the end and beginning of the Torah reading cycle.
According to the IDF’s assessment, the attack began to materialize in the early hours of October 7. Hamas reportedly began preparing its forces around 11:00 p.m. on October 6, after spending the day putting them on alert and gathering weapons, and completed briefings by 4:00 a.m. on October 7.
The infiltration started with the first wave at 6:29 a.m., as 1,154 members of Hamas’s Nukhba forces breached the security barrier between Gaza and Israel. The IDF declared a state of emergency at 6:43 a.m., followed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) at 7:10 a.m.
Between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., 3,400 militants had entered Israeli territory. Shortly before 8:00 a.m., Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif called on civilians in Gaza to join the attacks. The assessment states that after 9:00 a.m., attackers exploited IDF failures and seized opportunities to advance the assault. Some reportedly intended to penetrate deeper into Israeli territory.
The IDF managed to halt several of the “main attacks” by around 1:00 p.m., but hundreds of attackers remained in Israel at 3:00 p.m. The IDF reports regaining control of some communities and surrounding areas by 9:00 p.m., but dozens were still present around midnight.
“We underestimated the level of brutality Hamas would display in combat,” IDF senior officials wrote.
Prior to the October 7 attacks, the IDF’s primary focus was on Iran and Hezbollah, with Hamas considered a secondary threat. The IDF also assumed that it could contain Hamas’s activities while working towards “gradually improving the existing reality” with the aim of eliminating the terror group.
The IDF also operated under the belief that “Hamas did not want a full-scale war,” leading Israel to conclude that a large-scale invasion was improbable. The IDF assessment acknowledges that Hamas exploited Israel’s perception of the situation to its advantage.
Another significant misjudgment highlighted in the assessment was the IDF’s belief that the main threat from Hamas was the rockets and mortars fired from Gaza. This, combined with a reliance on defense tactics, a barrier, and the reduction of troops on the Israel-Gaza border, led to disaster.
Israel’s Intelligence Directorate did not fully comprehend or analyze the intelligence it possessed regarding Hamas and its intentions. This also apparently extends to the IDF’s understanding of the Shi’ite “Axis” and its views on Israel. The IDF states that the review revealed deeply ingrained systemic issues within the intelligence directorate and its culture.
Since 2018, the Intelligence Directorate had been collecting information on Hamas’s concept for a large-scale attack on Israel. However, the plan was deemed impractical and considered to reflect Hamas’s long-term goals.
In August 2021, intelligence described a plan for a large-scale assault on Israeli communities and military outposts surrounding the Gaza Strip. Intelligence officials failed to connect this new information with the data gathered in 2018.
Intelligence received in the months leading up to October 7 indicated that Hamas was conducting training exercises for raids. This apparently altered Israel’s elite Unit 8200’s assessment of the situation, but this was allegedly not communicated to senior leadership.
On the evening of October 6, 2023, Israeli SIM cards were activated inside Gaza. However, this did not trigger an alert because it had occurred before. These same SIM cards were later used by Hamas militants for communication after crossing the border into Israel. There were also indications that night that Hamas leaders were meeting. However, according to the IDF’s assessment, neither of these facts was sufficient to change the Intelligence Directorate’s perception of Gaza, and therefore no alert was issued.
There were also signs of both usual and unusual Hamas activity that evening. The inquiry revealed that intelligence sources that could have been used overnight to enhance information were not utilized. However, the IDF asserts that even if the Intelligence Directive had changed its assessment of the situation, it would have resulted in a higher alert for a localized Hamas offensive, but not for an all-out war.
The IAF was found to have met or exceeded the defined standards for readiness, except for two instances due to heavy rocket fire. However, these standards were not aligned with what would have been necessary to prepare for a large-scale surprise attack. The IDF concluded that there was “significant difficulty” in distinguishing between IDF troops, civilians, and terrorists.
While the IAF struck key targets, the IDF acknowledges that even in its review of the strikes, it is difficult to determine if a more effective strike effort could have been achieved given the circumstances.
However, it was noted that the IDF did not prepare for anything like the brutal October 7 massacre.
“We became overly reliant on the precise intelligence and information we received as commanders and failed to consider alternative scenarios. This failure will be forever etched in our memories, and we will never and should never forget it,” IDF senior officials wrote.
In its conclusion, the IDF notes that the assessment of the situation in Gaza and regarding Hamas was so deeply ingrained in the establishment that there was no in-depth discussion about alternative possibilities. Additionally, it now states that it was “incorrect” to attempt to “conflict manage” Hamas, and in the future, the elimination of threats should be prioritized.
The assessment also addresses the possibility of a future attack, stating that a preventative strategy will be crucial.
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