(SeaPRwire) –   Iran’s extensive missile capabilities are largely attributed to the communist North Korean regime, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism, which collaborates closely with Iran, states a prominent expert on the strategic partnership between the two nations.

Bruce Bechtol, co-author of “Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership Between Iran and North Korea,” informed Digital that “The missile fired at Diego Garcia was a Musudan. Iran acquired 19 of these from North Korea, receiving them in 2005. This capability has been available to them since 2005, and it is not a ‘secret weapon.'”

Last week, Digital reported that Iran considerably intensified its military actions against the U.S. by launching two intermediate-range ballistic missiles towards Diego Garcia, approximately 2,500 miles from Iran.

Bechtol stated that “As the conflict with the United States and Israel has progressed, Iran’s most significant threat has been its ballistic missiles, which have been launched not only at U.S. installations and Israeli urban centers but also at neighboring Islamic nations. Therefore, understanding this capability and its origins is crucial.”

He added, “Among the short-range ballistic missiles Iran has deployed against vital U.S. facilities and neighboring Arab states is a crucial system known as the ‘QIAM.’ The QIAM’s development and enhancement benefited from North Korean aid… A significant amount of North Korean proliferation to Iran is currently evident in the ongoing conflict.”

The combined U.S.-Israeli military campaign against the Iranian regime, which the U.S. State Department identifies as the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism, is now in its fifth week.

Bechtol, a political science professor in the Department of Security Studies at Angelo State University in Texas, pointed out that the Wisconsin Project indicates North Korea built a substantial missile test site in Emamshahr, Fars Province, Iran, along with a tracking facility in Tabas, South Khorasan province.

He mentioned that North Korea provided Iran with vital technology “for targets located at greater distances from Iran.”

“North Korea supplied approximately 150 No Dong systems to Iran in the late 1990s. The Iranians were reportedly highly satisfied with these missiles and, mirroring the previous Scud C factory arrangement, commissioned Pyongyang to establish a No Dong production facility within Iran.”

Bechtol further explained, “The Iranians designated this ‘new’ missile as the Shahab-3. The Shahab-3 closely replicates the No Dong. After the Shahab-3 became operational, North Korea collaborated with Iran to enhance its range and destructive power.”

He stated, “With North Korean support, the Iranians subsequently manufactured (at the No Dong facility) the Emad and the Ghadr. The Emad boasts a range of 1,750 kilometers (approximately 1,087 miles), while the Ghadr reaches 1,950 kilometers (approximately 1,212 miles). Iran has deployed these two systems against Israel and its Arab neighbors (including U.S. military installations within those nations) during the initial phases of this conflict.”

Bechtol noted that North Korea was instrumental in developing an Iranian missile warhead weighing between 1.5 and 2 tons for the potent Khorramshahr-4. He added, “Another system, even more destructive than those previously mentioned, is capable of striking Israel. This system is named the ‘Khorramshahr,’ and its fourth iteration, the ‘Khorramshahr-4,’ has demonstrated the capacity to carry the largest warhead in Iran’s missile arsenal, seemingly equipped with cluster munitions.”

He characterized the strategic alliance, observing: “North Korea acts as the vendor, and Iran as the purchaser. North Korea disseminates weapon systems, technology, parts, components, technicians, engineers, specialists, and military expertise (like the construction of subterranean facilities) to Iran. Iran compensates North Korea with currency and petroleum. It’s that straightforward.”

Bechtol asserted that the sole method to halt this activity involves enforcing sanctions against North Korea. “The necessary sanctions are already established. However, the USA and its primary allies must rigorously implement them. We must target banks, shell companies, and cyber organizations to cut off funding and disrupt or dismantle the supply chain.”

He concluded, “Greater focus and action are required through the Proliferation Security Initiative — an underutilized tool for preventing North Korean armaments from reaching rogue states and terrorist organizations. Severing the supply chain effectively halts proliferation.”