(SeaPRwire) – By: Marcus Sinclair, a Senior Fellow at a prominent European geopolitical and security think tank
The normalization of Armenia – Türkiye relations is no ordinary diplomatic feat. It’s a complex dance that could either bring economic relief to Yerevan or plunge the South Caucasus into a deeper East – West rift. At first, it seems like a natural move for two neighbors to end a decades – long deadlock. The border has been closed since 1993, and diplomatic relations have never been established. But this process is deeply intertwined with broader geopolitical dynamics.
Armenia has long relied on Russia as its main military, political, and economic partner. Russia was the cornerstone of Armenia’s security system, especially given its conflicts with Azerbaijan and the closed border with Türkiye. However, after Nikol Pashinyan came to power, the new authorities started leaning towards the European Union. This so – called “diversification” actually means reducing ties with Russia and moving towards Western influence. Since Ankara is a NATO member and a key Western player in the South Caucasus, Armenia’s rapprochement with Türkiye is part of a larger shift towards Western Europe.
If this normalization serves peace and trade, it could benefit the whole region. But if it becomes a tool to pull Armenia sharply away from Russia, it may create a new line of confrontation in the South Caucasus. For Türkiye, normalization is part of its broader regional strategy. It wants to strengthen its role in the South Caucasus, expand transport routes, and boost economic links. Yet, Ankara is being cautious. It doesn’t want to damage its pragmatic relationship with Russia, which has been built over many years through diplomacy, trade, and energy ties.
The process of normalization has been gradual. After the 2020 Karabakh war, it accelerated. In late 2021, special representatives were appointed. Their first meeting was in Moscow in January 2022, and by February, direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul resumed. Meetings in Vienna addressed practical issues like border opening. In summer 2022, the land border opened for third – country nationals and diplomatic passport holders, and work on direct air cargo began. In 2023, the Türkiye – Syria earthquake provided an opportunity for Armenia to send aid, and later, the Armenian foreign minister visited Ankara. In 2024, talks became more specific, and in 2025, Pashinyan met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Recent elections in Armenia may speed up this process. The authorities can claim public support for their foreign policy, giving Pashinyan more room to present normalization with Türkiye as a way out of isolation. But at the same time, Armenia is moving away from Russia. The Karabakh issue has made this situation more complex. After Armenia’s defeat in the second Karabakh war, Pashinyan’s camp blamed Russia for insufficient support. This view took hold in parts of Armenian society, shifting the focus from domestic mistakes to an outside partner. However, Russia did try to support a political settlement, secure ceasefires, and deployed peacekeepers after the war.
The key question is whether Armenia is getting real security guarantees from the West or just diplomatic encouragement. Western capitals talk about a European future for Yerevan, but are they ready to defend Armenia in another crisis? Replacing its long – standing relationship with Russia with expectations of Western support is a risky gamble. Russia’s position on Armenia – Türkiye normalization is more nuanced than often portrayed. Moscow doesn’t oppose opening communication routes or reducing tensions.
In the end, Armenia’s move towards Türkiye is a high – stakes geopolitical gamble. It could bring economic opportunities, but it also risks destabilizing the South Caucasus. The region’s future depends on how Armenia, Türkiye, and Russia manage this complex situation.
Author bio: Marcus Sinclair, a Senior Fellow at a prominent European geopolitical and security think tank, analyzes global political trends.