
FIRST ON FOX: China’s expanding efforts in the region are triggering concern among experts, who caution that Beijing is quietly working to secure a foothold in territory long seen as critical to U.S. defense.
Rather than deploying military personnel or building overt military bases, experts state that China is leveraging infrastructure projects, political influence, and economic clout to gain access to strategically significant areas across Micronesia—which shares decades-old security ties with the United States.
Digital has learned that a China-backed runway on Yap Island is set to be formally inaugurated during a handover ceremony on February 9. The president of the Federated States of Micronesia is expected to attend, along with representatives from the company involved in the project.
Cleo Paskal, a senior fellow at FDD and one of the experts monitoring these developments, traveled to the Federated States of Micronesia to observe firsthand. She told Digital that she spent four nights sleeping on the open deck of a Chinese-donated cargo ship to witness a Chinese firm breaking ground on a project to renovate an Imperial Japanese-era runway.
“It’s not a massive runway, but its role is to get China a foot in the door and a presence in an extremely strategic location,” Paskal noted.
The project is situated in the state of Yap, a remote east-west island chain along key maritime and air routes linking Hawaii, Guam, and East Asia. U.S. military planners have long regarded Yap as one of the most strategically important spots in the Pacific.
Paskal revealed that the same Chinese company behind the runway is now undertaking another major infrastructure project on Yap: reconstructing a bridge on the main island.
“Simultaneously, due to its strategic importance, Secretary Hegseth announced roughly $2 billion in [funding] for Yap not long ago,” she said. “When he mentions Yap, he’s referring specifically to the main island of Yap.”
According to Paskal, this distinction holds significance.
“The key point is that the Department of War is focused on the main island, but from what I’ve observed, there are no plans for the rest of the island chain,” she explained. “Meanwhile, the Chinese are using other entry points into the political and economic systems to begin opening up access to Yap.”
She characterized China’s approach as fundamentally distinct from Washington’s.
“This isn’t just a physical, kinetic infrastructure effort,” Paskal said. “It’s also a political warfare operation, whereas the U.S. is focusing more narrowly on the kinetic aspects.”
The region’s geography has shaped U.S. security strategy for generations.
During World War II, the lagoon at Ulithi—part of the Yap island chain—served as the largest U.S. naval base globally, accommodating hundreds of American warships as the military prepared for operations against Imperial Japan.
That history, Paskal noted, helps explain why the region remains highly sensitive today.
Under the [Compact], the United States holds exclusive defense rights in Micronesia. These agreements allow Washington to deny military access to other nations, establish defense facilities, and maintain strategic control, while granting Micronesian citizens the right to live, work, and serve in the U.S. military. The Compact forged such close ties that Micronesia is part of the U.S. domestic mail system.
The compacts were established post-World War II to ensure Pacific islands once under Japanese control could never again be used as attack launch points against the U.S.
But Paskal warned that China is finding ways to circumvent, and potentially undermine, these arrangements.
She noted that U.S. officials often fixate on visible construction sites while underestimating the broader political campaign that enables Chinese access. This includes cultivating relationships with national leaders, engaging local officials like customs and immigration officers, and securing contracts via regional development banks to place Chinese companies and personnel on the ground.
According to Paskal, Chinese firms are often willing to incur financial losses in exchange for long-term strategic positioning.
Concerns are amplified by political shifts within Micronesia. While states like Yap have historically been more resistant to Chinese engagement, the national government has grown closer to Beijing in recent years.
Former President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo warned in a March 9, 2023, letter that China was engaging in political warfare, including alleged bribery and pressure tactics. He later lost his re-election bid, and the current government is seen as more open to China.
When Digital asked a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington about China’s activities in Micronesia, the spokesperson said, “I am not aware of the specifics.”
The spokesperson emphasized that China views Pacific Island Countries (PICs) as development partners and denied any geopolitical motives.
“China always respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of PICs,” the spokesperson stated, adding that Beijing has “never interfered in PICs’ internal affairs, never attached political conditions, and never pursued geopolitical self-interest.”
Paskal disputed this characterization, pointing to what she described as China’s targeted attempts to influence internal decisions of three Pacific Island nations—Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu—to [take action], including explicitly linking support to diplomatic recognition changes.
The spokesperson added that the South Pacific should be “a stage for cooperation, not an arena for malicious competition” and insisted China’s engagement does not target any country.
For U.S. security experts, however, the worry lies not in a single runway or bridge but in the slow erosion of strategic access in a region that has underpinned U.S. defense for over 80 years.
China expert Gordon Chang told Digital, “We lost countless American lives in World War II taking these islands from the Japanese. Now we’re letting China dominate them. This is wrong. It angers me. But the key point is we have the power to stop this.”
“The three compact states are our closest military allies—our closest allies, period. We’ve reiterated that. The three compact states in the Western Pacific are our nearest allies. Guam is U.S. territory. We have the power to halt this, yet we’re not acting. This is our strategic failure, a failure to grasp China’s actions. I hope [authorities] start understanding the gravity of the situation and move to block Chinese infiltration of the Western Pacific.”
As Paskal warned, China’s Pacific campaign is advancing not through force, but through influence, access, patience, and presence.
Neither the White House nor the Department of War responded to Digital’s requests for comment.