(SeaPRwire) –   Nuclear weapons experts are urging the Trump administration to ensure that any new agreement with Iran explicitly prohibits the country from using plutonium from its nuclear facilities to develop atomic bombs.

While the administration and non-proliferation specialists have primarily concentrated on Iran’s uranium-based nuclear weapons program, there is growing concern that Tehran could exploit this oversight by secretly pursuing a plutonium-driven pathway to building nuclear weapons.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), stated to Digital: “I genuinely believe any proposed deal with Iran must address the plutonium route to nuclear weapons. Israel has struck the Arak heavy water reactor twice in the past year—once in June 2025 and again in March 2026. Intelligence indicated that Iran had repeatedly attempted to rebuild the facility even after these attacks, so any future agreement should include safeguards against the plutonium pathway.”

According to Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former deputy for nonproliferation policy at the Department of Defense (1989–1993), Iran could potentially use plutonium derived from spent fuel at its Bushehr nuclear reactor to construct an atomic weapon.

In a recent article on the Real Clear Defense website, he emphasized: “Washington must ensure that Iran does not remove the spent fuel from Bushehr or extract plutonium from it. This can and should be accomplished without resorting to military action.”

Sokolski recommended that the Pentagon monitor whether Iran removes any spent fuel from the Bushehr plant, suggesting surveillance via space-based assets or drones, as was done in 2012. He also proposed that any peace deal between President Trump and Tehran include provisions for near-real-time monitoring of both the Bushehr reactor and its spent fuel pond, similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) previous oversight of Iran’s enrichment activities.

In an April article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sokolski asserted that Iran possesses enough plutonium to produce more than 200 nuclear warheads. He pointed out: “The last time IAEA inspectors visited Bushehr was on August 27, 2025. Even during periods when inspectors had routine access, visits occurred only every 90 days—a timeframe sufficient for diverting spent fuel and possibly fabricating it into nuclear weapons.”

He further noted: “President Obama did not demand such continuous surveillance, despite repeated requests from the IAEA; Iran consistently refused.”

Recent IAEA reports have failed to provide detailed analysis of the plutonium route to nuclear weapons.

A State Department spokesperson told Digital that “Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to the United States and the entire world.”

The spokesperson continued: “Today, Iran remains in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by refusing full cooperation with the IAEA. Iran’s leadership must engage in meaningful diplomatic negotiations with the United States to resolve the nuclear issue permanently.”

David Albright, a physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, expressed skepticism when asked about Iran’s intentions regarding plutonium from Bushehr’s spent fuel. The former weapons inspector argued:

“First, Iran would need a design for a plutonium-based nuclear weapon that it has never developed—there is no evidence of such a design in the Nuclear Archive. Second, any attempt to divert material from Bushehr would likely be detected, prompting Russia to halt enriched uranium supplies, which would shut down a multibillion-dollar project vital for regional electricity generation. Third, most of the plutonium in the spent fuel is reactor-grade, and it may not even be suitable for weapons production.”

Albright added: “Although reactor-grade plutonium can theoretically be used to make nuclear weapons, doing so successfully—especially achieving significant explosive yield—is extremely challenging.” He also remarked that former National Security Adviser John Bolton has raised concerns about this issue for decades, calling it a remote possibility that was initially rejected during the Bush administration.

Despite these arguments, persistent fears remain over Iran’s deceptive tendencies and its ultimate goal of acquiring nuclear weapons capability. As a result, calls continue for a complete ban on Iran’s plutonium reprocessing and enhanced surveillance of its plutonium infrastructure within any future U.S.-led agreement.

Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program, told Digital: “The United States must insist on a permanent and verifiable prohibition on plutonium reprocessing in Iran under any negotiated settlement.”

Stricker highlighted that Russia has also recognized the risks involved. She explained: “To Russia’s credit, it required Iran to allow inspectors back into the Bushehr facility following the June 2025 airstrikes, and those inspections resumed last August. While the plutonium produced at Bushehr is not ideal for nuclear weapons due to its low quality, Iran has not actively pursued the plutonium route since the early 2000s, making it difficult to restart such efforts. Additionally, Tehran would need to covertly acquire and equip a clandestine plutonium reprocessing plant along with advanced machinery to handle and chemically process the fuel—creating substantial barriers to developing weapons-grade material.”

She concluded by stating: “The IAEA could reduce proliferation risks at Bushehr by increasing inspection frequency to monthly intervals. Alternatively, Russia could remove the accumulated spent fuel from the site.”