(SeaPRwire) –   The recent apprehension of two Israeli Air Force members on espionage charges has highlighted Iran’s intensifying campaign to infiltrate the Israeli military by co-opting internal personnel.

Over the past 18 months, the Israel Police, in coordination with the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), have probed more than 20 separate cases involving between 40 and 50 suspects. While many remain detained, authorities suspect that other individuals involved in these networks have yet to be identified.

Capt. Sefi Berger of the Israel Police’s Lahav 433 unit, which oversees Iranian espionage investigations, noted that Tehran is primarily focused on gathering intelligence to facilitate attack planning, as well as tracking high-profile figures and other sensitive locations.

Compensation for these activities varies significantly. One group of seven suspects reportedly received roughly $300,000, whereas an Iron Dome reservist was allegedly paid $1,000—or in some instances, even less.

“People might believe they are going to get rich, but the money is not life-changing,” Berger stated. “In one instance last year involving two soldiers, one received just $21 and has been incarcerated for a year and a half.”

Iranian recruitment strategies involve infiltrating WhatsApp and Facebook groups frequented by Israelis looking for freelance work, as well as utilizing pornography sites to obtain compromising material for blackmail. Recruitment also exploits the emotional vulnerabilities of individuals whose judgment may be impaired.

“During the recruitment process, a bond can form between the handler and the asset. Sometimes the individual is seeking a father figure or a friend—someone who will listen without judgment,” Berger explained.

Gonen Ben Itzhak, a former Shin Bet handler who spent years recruiting sources within Palestinian society, described the situation as exceptionally grave, noting that he has never witnessed such a high volume of espionage attempts against Israel.

“The million-dollar question is what makes a good recruit. There is no simple answer. There are certain indicators that someone might be more susceptible. The Iranians utilize social media—a tool we didn’t have in the same capacity—and it is highly effective for identifying potential motives,” he said.

As a handler, Ben Itzhak explained that he aimed to recruit as many viable candidates as possible while avoiding those who might draw attention, such as known criminals. He characterized the process as gradual and often unpredictable.

“Initially, they must agree to meet in secret. Sometimes they show up but refuse to share information. I would start with basic questions—like who leads Hamas in their village,” he said.

“Sometimes it takes time. Some refuse to cooperate, while others may act as double agents. In many cases, they are trained to gather information without being detected. It is a process,” Ben Itzhak added.

On Friday, indictments were issued against an Israeli civilian and three soldiers arrested in March for allegedly working for Iranian intelligence and conducting security-related missions before joining the IDF.

As part of these alleged operations, the defendants documented and transmitted photos and videos of locations such as train stations, shopping centers, and security cameras to their handlers, and were at one point ordered to acquire weapons. They also allegedly leaked documents from the Air Force Technical School, where some of the suspects had been students.

In March, 22-year-old Haifa resident Ami Gaydarov was arrested for allegedly manufacturing explosives intended to target a senior Israeli official under the direction of an Iranian agent.

Last month, a resident of the Israeli-Arab city of Qalansawe was detained on suspicion of spying for “a hostile actor, mediated through the Al Jazeera channel.” Investigations revealed that Miqdad Moder Hosni Natur established contact with his handler after being introduced while searching for employment through the Qatari-based news outlet.

Under Israeli law, communicating with a foreign agent can result in a 15-year prison sentence. Providing intelligence can lead to over 10 years in prison, while aiding the enemy during wartime carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, or in severe cases, the death penalty.

Berger also cautioned Israelis against attempting to deceive foreign agents, emphasizing that any form of contact is a serious crime.

“We had a hotel worker near the Dead Sea who falsely told Iranians that a group of Israelis would be arriving. He claimed it was a lie, but I explained that he had effectively placed a target on that hotel, its staff, and its guests, and encouraged an attack,” Berger said.

“People unfamiliar with this world should not engage in it. Contact is an offense, providing information is an offense, and aiding the enemy is the most severe,” he added.

While most suspects remain in custody awaiting trial, some cases are currently moving through the court system.

One concluded case involved 70-year-old Moti Maman, who was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison after traveling to Iran twice to meet with intelligence agents to discuss carrying out terrorist activities in Israel. He also discussed the potential assassination of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Former Mossad operative Gad Shimron stated that while these espionage efforts have caused damage, their impact remains tactical rather than strategic. However, he warned against complacency.

“The electronic Iron Dome is attempting to catch Israelis willing to work for the Iranians, and I believe it is quite efficient,” he said. “But one should never underestimate the enemy. I am certain they are investing significant effort and that they have achieved successes we are not yet aware of.”