KAOHSIUNG: Last week, President William Lai unveiled a substantial $40 billion supplementary defense procurement proposal, presenting it as evidence that the self-governing, democratic island is resolute in countering escalating military pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC, despite never having governed Taiwan, asserts sovereignty over its territory.

A State Department spokesperson conveyed to Digital that, “We welcome Taiwan’s announcement of a new $40 billion special defense procurement budget. In alignment with the Taiwan Relations Act and over 45 years of commitment across numerous U.S. Administrations, the United States supports Taiwan’s acquisition of crucial defense capabilities, proportionate to the threat it encounters.”

The spokesperson additionally commended Taipei, stating, “We also welcome the Lai administration’s recent pledges to raise defense spending to at least 3% of GDP by 2026 and 5% of GDP by 2030, which demonstrates a firm resolve to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capacities.”

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)—the de facto American embassy—responded very favorably almost immediately after Lai’s proposal was made public. Courtney Donovan Smith, a political columnist for the Taipei Times, told Digital that the strong backing from AIT “constitutes a public American endorsement.”

A day following Lai’s announcement, Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo informed the media that preliminary discussions have already taken place with the United States concerning the types of weapons Taiwan aims to purchase as part of this budget, which is set to run from 2026 to 2033. However, Koo stated he could not publicly disclose any details of these discussions until Congress receives a formal notification.

Yet, some in Taiwan expressed apprehension that the administration’s language was somewhat understated, and did not originate from sufficiently senior officials.

Those concerned about what they perceived as a subdued tone from the wondered if the timing might be sensitive, coming shortly after President Trump and Chinese leader agreed to a trade deal, and just days after Xi telephoned Trump to reiterate Beijing’s claims over Taiwan, claims the U.S. “acknowledges” but does not accept.

Even so, Ross Feingold, a Taipei-based political risk analyst and Tamkang University assistant professor, told Digital that fundamental U.S. support has not shifted and that when it comes to, he stated, “If Taiwan is a willing buyer, the Trump administration is likely to be a willing seller.”

Also causing disquiet among China’s communist leaders’ sensitive egos is, a conservative who became Japan’s first female prime minister in October. She appeared to break long-standing Japanese strategic ambiguity over Taiwan when, asked on Nov. 7 in parliament whether a Chinese attack on Taiwan would qualify as “a situation threatening Japan’s survival.”

Takaichi did not deflect with a “I don’t comment on hypotheticals.” Instead, she declared, “If there are battleships and the use of force, no matter how you consider it, it could constitute a survival-threatening situation.”

Under Japan’s 2015 security law, such a designation could permit Japanese military action in defense of an ally.

China, as expected, lashed out, immediately labeling her remarks “egregious.” A Chinese diplomat in Osaka escalated further, reposting coverage on X with a threat-like warning: “The dirty head that sticks itself in must be cut off.”

Kerry K. Gershaneck, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and a former U.S. Marine counterintelligence officer, told Digital that the U.S. needed to clearly condemn China for threats against Japan and the Japanese prime minister. Gershaneck warned that Asian allies remember past U.S. abandonment under what he called the “do not provoke China!” policy of the Obama administration. “Unless high-level Washington officials signal stronger support,” he said, “the Trump 47 administration risks going down in history as Barack Hussein Obama’s third term.”

Feingold observed that while Takaichi’s stance was enthusiastically received in Taiwan, the excitement “was unsustainable and not based on a formal policy decision by Japan to defend Taiwan.”

Following reports that President Trump phoned the Japanese prime minister and requested that she temper talk about Taiwan, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara Minoru issued a strong denial, asserting Trump did not advise Takaichi to “moderate the tone of her comments about Taiwan.”

While geopolitical shifts captured headlines, Lai’s real challenge is domestic. Moreover, Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party does not hold a majority.

Cheng Li-wun, the new chair of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), campaigned against increasing to 5% of GDP and has repeatedly argued Taiwan is “not an ATM” for “unreasonable” military budgets. The KMT supports renewed engagement with Beijing and acceptance of the “1992 Consensus,” a proposed framework that allows both sides to claim there is “one China” while interpreting the meaning differently. Lai rejects that position entirely, calling it a path toward subordination to China.

Bryce Barros, associate fellow at GLOBSEC and a former U.S. Senate national security advisor, told Digital that there are significant hurdles. “Opposition leaders have cited cuts to other essential services like healthcare, lack of details on how the budget will be paid for and concerns over more hostilities with China,” he said. But Barros said the head of the de facto American embassy has called for bipartisan support for the bill, and he noted Lai needs only six opposition defections for the vote to pass.

Analysts also emphasize the proposal is not solely for U.S. weapons. Lai seeks major investment in domestic defense manufacturing, including a “dome” anti-missile system, which could help mitigate accusations of excessive spending to curry favor with Washington. Nevertheless, the plan still confronts a volatile parliament and certain retaliation from China.