As Iran grapples with ongoing Israeli attacks targeting its military and nuclear sites, discussions are growing about potential future scenarios.

Experts suggest the collapse of the Islamic Republic is now a real possibility, but they caution that its replacement could lead to either greater freedom or increased instability.

Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince of Iran and a prominent opposition figure, stated yesterday that sources within Iran indicate a rapid breakdown of the regime’s command structures. He added that the international community is recognizing the Islamic Republic’s lack of a future, leading to discussions about a post-Islamic Republic Iran.

Behnam Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, suggests “evolution” or “devolution” are more accurate terms than “revolution,” indicating the possibility of improvement or decline. He emphasizes that in the Middle East, external shocks often lead to negative outcomes.

Taleblu notes that both the Iranian opposition and Western governments are unprepared for a potential regime collapse due to their reluctance to consider regime change. He argues that this lack of political strategy has left them ill-prepared.

Beni Sabti, an Iran expert at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, outlines four possible scenarios, with one being significantly worse than the others.

Sabti told Digital that the Iranian people are currently lacking leadership, energy, and hope since the women’s protests. He suggests one scenario involves internal collapse, similar to the Soviet Union, where a brigade commander, supported by loyalists, could rebel against the regime.

Sabti believes that after purges of many Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals, Iran’s regular army might be better positioned to revolt. He suggests they could even align with disillusioned members of the revolutionary guards, who could leverage their knowledge of the system and bureaucracy to quietly organize a transition, potentially with relatively few casualties.

Taleblu agrees that a regime transition could originate from within but points out Iran’s decades of efforts to prevent coups.

He explains that promotions are based more on loyalty than competence, making a classic military coup less likely, though not impossible, requiring significant political maneuvering.

Sabti’s second scenario involves a popular uprising triggered by the release of political prisoners. He notes that many political leaders in Iranian prisons could rally the public if released. These leaders, once part of the regime but now advocating for improved relations with the U.S., could establish a “cold peace” with Israel, though not a hostile one.

Taleblu points out that Iranian society has undergone significant changes in the past decade. He estimates that at least 80% of the population dislikes the regime, and protests since 2017, particularly the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, were driven by economic, social, and environmental issues, not just political ones.

Sabti’s third possibility is the return of exiled leaders, noting a strong sense of nostalgia for the monarchy. He suggests that if infighting breaks out, people might rally around a symbolic figure, inviting them to return as a unifying presence.

Taleblu acknowledges that figures like Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi could play a role but not as rulers. He envisions the diaspora as a bridge to a new Iran, not its definers, emphasizing that the Iranian people inside the country should shape its future.

Sabti considers the fourth scenario, the regime’s survival, as the worst possible outcome.

Taleblu concurs, warning that survival would lead to a more oppressive future with a more militarized and less clerical regime. He raises the question of whether Iran would become like Turkey or Pakistan, or even more messianic, noting a contrast between the corrupt older IRGC members and the messianic younger ones.

A key question concerns the future role of Iran’s non-Persian communities, including the Ahwazi, Baloch, Azeris, and Kurds. Aref Al-Kaabi, executive president of the State of Ahwaz, stated that trust-building between these communities and the Persian opposition is crucial for change.

Al-Kaabi believes regime change is possible with continued Israeli strikes, support for non-Persian groups, international will, and trust between Arabs, Kurds, Baloch, Azeris, and the Persian opposition. He suggests that if these conditions are met, the regime’s collapse could happen quickly.

He added that the IRGC has recently conducted widespread arrests in Ahwaz to prevent mobilization, targeting Arabs from Abadan, Bushehr, Sheyban, and Shoaibiya.

Al-Kaabi also criticized the Persian opposition abroad for viewing non-Persian groups as separatists and refusing to collaborate with them, which he believes is a major reason the regime remains in power.

Taleblu cautioned against Western efforts to divide Iran, arguing that promoting balkanization would be a moral and strategic mistake that would undermine efforts to unite the Iranian population.

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